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Abstract
We present an agent-based model inspired by the Evolutionary Minority Game
(EMG), albeit strongly adapted to the case of competition for limited resources
in ecology. The agents in this game become able, after some time, to predict the
a priori best option as a result of an evolution-driven learning process. We show
that a self-segregated social structure can emerge from this process, i.e., extreme
learning strategies are always favoured while intermediate learning strategies tend
to die out. This result may contribute to understanding some levels of organization
and cooperative behaviour in ecological and social systems. We use the ideas and
results reported here to discuss an issue of current interest in ecology: the mistimings
in egg laying observed for some species of bird as a consequence of their slower rate
of adaptation to climate change in comparison with that shown by their prey. Our
model supports the hypothesis that habitat-specific constraints could explain why
different populations are adapting differently to this situation, in agreement with
recent experiments.
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Predator-Prey
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1 Introduction
Minority games (Challet and Zhang, 1998), and more recently Evolutionary
Minority Games (EMG) (Johnson et. al., 1999a; Johnson et. al., 2000; de Cara
et. al., 2000; Johnson et. al., 2003; Hod and Nakar, 2002; Hod, 2003; Sysi-Aho
et. al., 2003; Johnson et. al., 1999b; Lo et. al., 2000), have received widespread
attention in recent years as a useful model to describe competition for highly
limited resources in complex systems, especially in economics. These games
are essentially based on a minority rule (Challet and Zhang, 1998) according
to which N agents compete repeatedly for some resources by choosing between
two options A or B. Each agent makes its choice, and those agents belonging
to the less (most) frequently chosen option are considered the winners (losers),
so they are rewarded (fined). So, the idea behind this game is that the agents
must always try to be in the minority: few individuals choosing the same
option as yourself means less competitors, and so it should be easier to obtain
the resource. The decisions taken by the agents are chosen according to a
pool of strategies available, and these strategies are based on the m previous
outcomes in the game, as that information is assumed to be accessible to all
of the agents. To give a simple example, a specific strategy in a minority game
with m = 2 has the form
S = {(A,A)→ A, (A,B)→ B, (B,A)→ A, (B,B)→ A}.
This means that if the two previous winning options in the game were (A,A),
an agent following strategy S will choose option A the next time; if the last
winning options were (A,B), that agent will choose B, and so on. At the
beginning of the game several strategies are assigned to each agent, and the
agent tends to choose from among them the strategy that gave better results
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in the past; however, many different versions of the minority game exist, where
the rules that determine the strategies chosen by the agents are different. Here,
we will skip the minor details on the mechanisms of the minority game, since
that is outside the scope of the current work; an exhaustive compilation of
works on minority games can be found in http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics.
In the evolutionary version (EMG) of the game (Johnson et. al., 1999a), all
the agents are assigned the same strategies but they can i) follow that given
strategy with probability pk or ii) do exactly the opposite with probability
1 − pk, where pk is different for each agent (the subindex k denotes the kth
agent). Those agents performing the worst (losing many times) are forced to
change their value of pk; so, in the EMG there is an implicit learning process
based on trial and error. As a consequence, the system tends towards an
optimal distribution of pk values for which the number of winners is as close
to N/2 as possible (note that, by definition, in a minority game the number of
winners cannot be higher than N/2). As reported in (Johnson et. al., 1999a),
the most striking result arising from the EMG is the natural emergence of
segregated behaviour: those agents that behave in an extreme way (pk → 0
and pk → 1) perform better than those with intermediate behaviour, so that
the individuals tend to segregate into two groups: those who always follow
the given strategy and those who never follow the strategy. From the point
of view of complex systems, it has been claimed that this result may help
to understand some levels of organization such as crowding (Johnson et. al.,
2000; Cont and Bouchaud, 2000) and cooperation (de Cara, 2000), which
are common in many social and biological systems. Specifically, within the
context of the EMG some authors have coined the term unintentional or
indirect cooperation to illustrate the behaviour observed (Quan et. al., 2003;
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Hod and Nakar, 2004). This concept refers to the fact that in the EMG many
agents tend to behave similarly (either pk → 0 or pk → 1), but not consciously,
but rather because the global winning probability is higher that way. This is
different from other games (for example, the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma)
where cooperation is a conscious option given to the agents (Nowak et. al.,
2004; Nowak 2006).
2 Minority Games in ecology
In general, minority games are helpful to describe multi-agent systems where
each agent (individual) is able to analyze the history of the system (i.e., the
success of the different strategies used before) in order to make its next deci-
sion. For this reason they have been especially designed and used to explain
the complex dynamics of some financial markets (Johnson et. al., 2003), al-
beit some authors have stated that similar ideas could also hold within an
ecological context; probably the best example being foraging behaviour (Hod
and Nakar, 2002; Hod, 2003). However, as far as we know very few real ef-
forts have been made to extend minority games to ecological situations. In
(Tella et. al., 2001) the authors presented a model, inspired by the rules of
the minority game, to explore the colonial versus solitary behaviour in birds
as a function of predation pressure, and some discussions on the connection
between minority games and ecological evolution were provided in (de Cara
et. al., 2000; Aho et. al., 2003).
The apparent lack of interest by ecologists in these games is probably due to
the fact that the most interesting and dramatic situations concerning decision-
making in animals are not well described by such concepts as trial and error
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and pool of strategies involved in minority games. Instead, in ecology most of
the interest lies in understanding those situations where individuals perform
just one or a few critical decisions throughout their whole life (concerning,
for example, timing in reproduction or choice of habitat); these decisions have
been called ’fitness-critical actions’ in a very recent work by Heesch and Little
(2006). Intuitively, decision-making in these ’fitness-critical actions’ follows
quite simple mechanisms (compared to the complex rules of minority games):
the individuals need to use their skills or their experience to predict the a
priori best option. By a priori best option we mean that option which would
be the winning one in the case where half of the agents choose A and the
other half choose B. In the basic minority game described above we have
considered that the agents choose between two identical options A or B, so
there is no a priori best option. However, it is easy (and more realistic) to
consider a game where A and B are intrinsically different. For example, in the
case of habitat selection, individuals usually need to choose between different
options with different habitat qualities. Some individuals may be able, from
past experience, to know in advance which the best choice is e.g. that where
the availability of food is higher. But if all the individuals are able to do this,
then all of them will choose the same option and the availability of food will
decrease there; in that case the a priori best option is not necessarily the
winning option. Those individuals that are not able to determine what the a
priori best option is will probably behave randomly or persistently (always
choosing the same option). The role of evolution and natural selection is thus
expected to be crucial in these processes, as stated in (Heesch and Little,
2006).
We note that these decision-making mechanisms are also common in human
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behaviour. For instance, drivers who have to choose between two alternative
routes in order to avoid traffic jams do not analyze every past experience
and make a decision according to a pool of strategies (contrary to what is
suggested by some authors (Hod, 2003)), but mainly use simpler strategies
like persistent behaviour (they always choose the same route because they do
not like to take risks) or they may simply listen to the traffic news to find out
what the a priori best route is.
According to these arguments, some essential elements which are absent in
the EMG must be considered in order to get a realistic implementation of
minority games in ecology. So, the aim of this work is to present a new game
where competition for resources is also introduced by means of a minority
rule, but the dynamics and strategies followed by the agents aim to capture
the dynamics of some ecological systems. In what follows, we will refer to this
new model as the Evolutionary Learning Game (ELG).
3 Mistiming in predator-prey systems caused by climate change
We now introduce a specific problem that has attracted the interest of ecolo-
gists in recent years (van Noordwijk et. al., 1995; Visser et. al., 1998; Grieco
et. al., 2002; Visser et. al., 2004; Gienapp and Visser, 2006) and has strongly
motivated our approach. In many species of bird, individuals must face the
problem of choosing the correct time for egg laying. This choice becomes dra-
matic if the availability of food is restricted to a very short period of time.
So, for survival in breeding, the correct timing of egg laying is necessary, so
that the feeding period matches the food peak. This process has been stud-
ied in recent decades for some species, such as great tits (Parus major) and
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blue tits (Parus caeruleus), whose main prey (caterpillar) is only available for
two or three weeks in the late spring (Visser et. al., 2004). At the moment
of egg laying (approximately one month before), the birds do not know when
the food peak will happen. The problem is partially overcome by the way
many of these birds develop with age the ability to follow some cues (based
on climate and other environmental parameters) to predict the right time for
laying (van Noordwijk et. al., 1995; Grieco et. al., 2002; Gienapp and Visser,
2006). In general, this capacity of an individual to adapt its behaviour to the
environmental conditions is known as phenotypic plasticity, and is usually a
heritable trait. Specifically, it has been demonstrated (Nussey et. al., 2005)
that plasticity in egg laying for birds is heritable.
The effects of global climate change, however, have put many biological species
to the test (Parmesan, 2006). As a consequence of warmer springs, caterpillars
have advanced their hatching date in many habitats (Visser et. al., 1998; Visser
et. al., 2004), so those birds with a higher plasticity in laying are expected to
adapt better to the new situation. According to the observational data, some
bird populations have become adapted, but in some other cases a very weak
response to the new situation has been observed (Visser et. al., 2004; Gienapp
and Visser, 2006). In the latter case, the mismatching between the feeding
period and the food peak will probably lead to a decline in the number of
individuals (Both et. al., 2006) or the habitat fitness (Visser, 2007). Although
different explanations have been provided, there is no clear understanding of
why different populations show different responses to the changing conditions
(Gienapp and Visser, 2006). As we discuss below, our model provides some
arguments that support the idea that resource constraints from each specific
habitat may be responsible for these differences.
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4 Rules of the Evolutionary Learning Game
We need to introduce two basic ideas that are missing from the original formu-
lation of the EMG, in order to reach a more realistic description of ecological
systems:
i) First, reproduction and death processes must play a fundamental role in the
dynamics of the system. In the EMG the agents continue to play indefinitely,
but in ecology the consequences of choosing a wrong option can obviously
be dramatic. If we want to explore the dynamics of systems over representa-
tive time scales, it is necessary to assume that the individuals may disappear
(die) and/or be replaced by new individuals (newborns) with some probabil-
ity. Moreover, the outcome obtained from any decision taken by the agents
must affect in some way their reproduction/survival probabilities.
ii) Secondly, in the EMG all of the agents have access to the same information,
and so all of them may use the same strategy. In ecology, however, as long as
an individual grows up it gains experience and, in consequence, it is expected
to choose better options. So, an individual learning process must be considered
somehow. In fact, the situation where the strategies chosen by the agents are
based on their individual histories has already been studied for the EMG
(see (de Cara, 2000) and the references therein), but here we will explore the
concept of learning from a different perspective.
In our model, each of the N agents competing in the game must repeatedly
choose between options A or B. Whether or not the decision taken by the agent
is the good one will be determined by a minority rule with an arbitrary cutoff,
as defined in (Johnson et. al., 1999b). This means that we assign a resource
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capacity L to one of the two options (we consider 0 < L < N/2 without loss
of generality) and a resource capacity N − L to the other option. If the real
number of agents choosing the first option is below L, then the resources per
capita in that option are higher than in the other one, so those agents are the
winners and the agents choosing the other option are the losers. If the number
of agents choosing the first option is above L, then the contrary arguments
hold.
We will consider that the option with capacity L is not always the same,
but is chosen randomly every time step in order to incorporate the effects of
a fluctuating environment, so sometimes option A will be the a priori best
option (that with a higher capacity) and sometimes not.
At each time step, the winners are rewarded with the possibility of repro-
ductive success. Every winner is given the possibility of producing a newborn
agent with a probability r. The newborn will replace one of the agents in the
game (to keep N constant) chosen randomly, so we assume that all of the
agents are equally likely to die.
The agents choose option A or B according to the following rules. Younger
agents act persistently : they make their first choice randomly and, after that,
they continue to choose the same option. However, after each time step all
the persistent agents are given the possibility of learning with probability ppk
(here pp stands for phenotypic plasticity and the subindex k denotes the kth
agent). If they learn, it means that they give up persistent behaviour; from
then on, they always choose the option with a higher capacity, so we will say
that they become wise agents.
Phenotypic plasticity in our model is thus considered equivalent to a learning
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capacity. This capacity can be inherited as follows: when a newborn appears,
its characteristic probability ppk is chosen randomly from an interval of width
w centred on the value of ppk′ from its father, with reflecting boundary con-
ditions at ppk = 0 and ppk = 1. So, we introduce an evolutionary dynamics
for the probabilities ppk into the model in a similar way as in the original
formulation of the EMG (Johnson et. al., 1999a). But note that in this case
the meaning of the width w is extremely important for the dynamics of the
system, as it measures the heritability of ppk, so the best strategies ppk will
be transmitted to the newborns only if w is not too high.
These are all the rules for our ELG. All of the agents will become wise sooner
or later unless they die first, but if there are too many wise agents then the
a priori best option will be crowded and will probably be the wrong one.
A complex dynamic thus emerges where learning as fast as possible is not
necessarily the best strategy, which may seem counterintuitive at first.
As some of the rules presented could be considered too simple or unrealistic
from a biological point of view, we tried to implement many different models
with increasingly complex rules in order to compare their performances:
i) We tried to introduce explicit reproduction and death algorithms in many
different ways (for example, by using exponential or logistic growth), so that
the number of agents N was allowed to change with time.
ii) We tried to replace the minority rule with some other competition rules,
even rules that allowed all the agents to be winners (or losers) at the same
time. For instance, we considered two independent capacities LA and LB for
the two possible options, so if the number of individuals choosing option A is
above (below) LA those agents are considered losers (winners).
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iii) We tried to reward and/or fine agents on their reproductive success and/or
their probability of survival. Of course, it is not necessary for the reproductive
success to be completely suppressed for the losers as in the simplified version
we have described; we could consider two reproductive rates rw and rl for
winners and losers respectively, with rw > rl.
iv) We tried to consider that the switching from persistent to wise behaviour
is not so radical, but the agents learn progressively according to a rate given
by ppk.
After these and many other trials, we have found that the qualitative be-
haviour exhibited by the ELG (which is shown in the following Section) is
highly robust. According to our results, it seems that there are only two el-
ements which are strictly necessary in order to obtain that behaviour: i) a
learning process regulated by the probabilities ppk and ii) that the number
of agents rewarded (fined) is proportional to the number of winners (losers).
The version of the ELG we have presented here is one of the simplest possible,
and so it offers the advantage that some analytical treatment is possible, as
we will show below.
5 Results
The greatest interest of our model lies in the form of the distribution of phe-
notypic plasticities P (ppk) that is reached in the steady state. In Figure 1 we
summarize the behaviour of P (ppk) as a function of the three parameters of
the model: L, r and w. All the results shown here were obtained by computing
the form of P (ppk) for N = 2001 after 10000 time steps (which is far enough to
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reach the steady state), and carried out an average of 25 different realizations.
Initially all the agents were considered newborns and the values of ppk were
assigned randomly; anyway, we have checked that our results are independent
of the initial conditions chosen.
The series of plots from 1.a to 1.d shows how P (ppk) changes when the value
of L is modified. Figures 1.a and 1.d correspond to extreme situations that
are clearly predictable. In the first case, when L → N/2 both options A and
B have similar resource capacities. Therefore, performing as a wise agent does
not represent an advantage, because the resource of choice (i.e. the larger one)
reaches its smallest possible size leading to overcrowding among wise agents.
As a consequence, learning is avoided and there is a tendency ppk → 0. In
the regime L → 0 one of the two options is much better than the other one.
In this situation, performing as a wise agent is a strong advantage, and so
the tendency ppk → 1 should be expected. But, surprisingly, there is a wide
range of intermediate values of L where segregated (obviously asymmetric)
behaviour is found. This means that in intermediate situations the dynamics
of the system tends to favour individuals which either learn as fast as possible
or avoid learning as much as possible.
Although segregated behaviour was also found for the EMG, the situation
reported here is clearly different. In the case of the EMG (Johnson et. al.,
1999a) the segregated behaviour in the steady state was independent of the
initial conditions and the values of the parameters introduced. However, Hod
and Nakar (2002) proved later that the model is extremely sensitive to the
prize-to-fine ratio, so for some parameters one observes a sharp transition
where self-segregation is destroyed. On the contrary, we have not noticed such
effects in our model, but the form of P (ppk) always changes smoothly for
13
any region of parameters considered. The other main difference between the
EMG and the ELG is that the results obtained here show an asymmetric
distribution of P (ppk). The reason for this is that in the ELG the persistent
and wise agents do not necessarily choose different options (while in the EMG
pk → 0 and pk → 1 represent opposite behaviours). This, together with the
different backgrounds considered and some ideas discussed below, shows that
the general dynamics of the EMG and the ELG are different, although there
are some major similarities between both.
One can observe in the series 1.e to 1.h the role of the reproduction probability
r on P (ppk) while keeping the other parameters constant. A high value of r
involves the appearance of many newborns and, according to the discussion
above, a wise strategy will then perform better that in a situation with few
newborns. For this reason, the model shows a tendency ppk → 0 for low r
and a tendency ppk → 1 for high r. In intermediate situations, a segregated
distribution is found again.
Finally, the role of w is shown in plots from 1.i to 1.l. As discussed above, the
value of w determines the heritability of the phenotypic plasticity. Low values
of w represent a high level of heritability and so the best strategies persist,
while a high value of w means that best strategies are not well transmitted
to breeding; so, for the latter P (ppk) is expected to tend to be uniform. The
value of w also indirectly affects the number of winners and losers; if w is
too high the best strategies do not persist and then the average number of
winners decreases. For this reason it is difficult to predict the exact form of
P (ppk) as a function of w. Actually, the specific role of w in the game is fairly
complicated, so this point will be addressed in detail in a further study. Note
that this is another important difference from the case of the EMG, where the
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final distribution P (pk) is almost independent of w (Johnson et. al., 1999a).
We can give some analytical support to the results shown in Figure 1 by
means of a mean-field-like approach as proposed before for the EMG (Lo et.
al., 2000). Here we keep as much as possible to the notation used there in
order to facilitate understanding.
First of all, note that we know the option that the wise agents will choose. We
also know that every persistent agent made its first choice randomly, so we
should expect on average for half of them to choose A and the other half to
choose B. Therefore, the whole problem is reduced to finding out how many
persistents are in the game. We denote FN(n) as the probability of n of the
N agents in the game being persistent. Similarly, we define GkN−1(n) as the
probability of n of the agents being persistent, given that the kth agent is the
only one that has not made its choice yet. Then, the following relation holds:
FN(n) = ΓppkG
k
N−1(n− 1) + (1− Γppk)G
k
N−1(n), (1)
where Γppk is the probability of the kth agent being persistent, given that
its phenotypic plasticity is ppk. In the following, we will use the simplified
notation Γ ≡ Γppk .
On the other hand, the winning probability τppk of an agent that has a plas-
ticity ppk can be written as
τppk =
Γ
2
α−1∑
n=0
GkN−1(n) +
(
1−
Γ
2
) N−1∑
n=α+1
GkN−1(n), (2)
where α = Int(2L) denotes the integer part of 2L. Following now the same
treatment as in (Lo et. al., 2000), we get from (1) and (2) the expression
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τppk =
Γ
2
α∑
n=0
FN(n) +
(
1−
Γ
2
) N−1∑
n=α+1
FN(n)
+Γ(Γ− 3/2)GkN−1(α). (3)
As stated in (Lo et. al., 2000), the two first terms correspond to the winning
probability of a kth agent whose action does not modify the result of the
game, once the other N − 1 agents have made their choice. Hence, the third
term is the essential one, as it measures the influence of the kth agent on the
final result. For example, imagine that after the first N − 1 agents have made
their choice, one half of them decide to follow option A (so one half choose
B); then, the last agent?s decision will determine which the winning option is;
the influence of this final decision on the probability τppk is what the last term
in (3) measures. In order to analyze this term, we need to find the explicit
expression of Γ as a function of ppk. This is easy to do, because after each
time step the persistents have a probability ppk of becoming wise agents and
an average survival probability s (according to the rules of our ELG, only the
range 0.5 < s < 1 holds here). Then, the probability of the kth agent being
persistent is
Γppk =
∑
∞
i=0 [s
i(1− ppk)
i]∑
∞
i=0 s
i
=
1− s
1− s(1− ppk)
. (4)
Now, we can give an explicit expression for the term Γ(Γ−3/2) from Equation
(3). It can be seen that Γ(Γ− 3/2) has the same appearance throughout the
whole range 0 < ppk < 1 and for the proper range of survival probabilities
0.5 < s < 1. It is always a negative convex function with a relative minimum
at ppk = (1 − s)/3s. This means that the third term in (3) always tends to
favour extreme values of ppk, which facilitates the emergence of segregated
behaviour; so, this gives some justification to our numerical results.
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We stress, however, that stationary analytical approaches such as the one used
here have some limitations, as the EMG and similar models never reach a true
stationary distribution (Hod, 2002). In fact, we have found for the ELG that
the number of persistents oscillates periodically over time, in accordance with
similar results found for the EMG (Hod, 2002). In that work, it was also argued
that when the amplitude of these oscillations increases, we observe in the EMG
a transition from self-segregated behaviour to clustering (where clustering is
characterized by a single-peaked distribution of pk values around pk = 1/2).
It is interesting to note that, on the contrary, in the ELG the amplitude
of the oscillations increases in the region where self-segregated behaviour is
found; so, the oscillations in our model seem to enforce self-segregation rather
than destroying it. This situation is shown in Figure 2, where the number of
persistents in the steady regime is plotted as a function of time for different
situations; dotted, dash-dotted and solid lines correspond to the cases 1.a,
1.c and 1.d reported in Figure 1, respectively. From Figure 2, it is also clear
that the mean number of persistents in the game increases as L decreases, in
accordance with our discussion above.
6 Discussion
We have presented a model that sets the ideas of minority games, which are
considerably popular tools for describing competition for resources in eco-
nomics, into an ecological context. The model presented here shows how social
segregation emerges from an evolutionary learning process (determined by the
distribution P (ppk)) in a group of individuals competing for strongly limited
resources. Note that if the learning process were not introduced to the model,
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then the dynamics of the system would be trivial. Neither persistent nor wise
behaviour on its own is an efficient strategy; evolutionary learning is the key
ingredient here for finding efficient cooperation between both. This idea, to-
gether with the robustness shown by our model (many other implementations
with more realistic rules led to similar qualitative results) seems to suggest
that our model could be of interest for understanding social organization in
complex evolutionary systems.
The results obtained here show that in the situation described by our model
intermediate learning strategies cannot persist for long times; the tendency
is always towards improvement (ppk → 1), suppression (ppk → 0) or the
coexistence of both (segregated distribution). It also contradicts the intuitive
idea that those individuals with a higher learning capacity must always be
favoured by selection. This is a consequence of the strong competition process
which is assumed in our ELG and in minority games in general: sometimes
the a priori worst option can be the best because many agents tend to choose
the a priori best option and then competition for the latter is higher.
Finally, we come back to the problem of egg laying in birds described before,
which can now be addressed using the ideas about learning and phenotypic
plasticity discussed here. In order to provide an analogy with our model, we
could imagine that option A means laying early and option B means laying
later. Those individuals with a higher plasticity very quickly become able to
follow some environmental cues in order to predict the right option A or B.
However, if the penalty for choosing a wrong option is not high (because there
are some other food resources available, or there are some other environmental
constraints on laying...) then selection will not favour individuals with higher
plasticity. In that case, when the individuals must face sudden environmen-
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tal changes their capacity to respond will be weak. In those habitats where
phenotypic plasticity is strongly rewarded (i.e., for L small in our model),
individuals are expected to follow efficient learning strategies, so they will be
able to respond better to environmental changes.
Therefore, the results of our model provide an evolutionary basis to the idea
that environmental constraints from each specific habitat could explain why
different bird populations are responding differently to climate-driven changes
in the behaviour of their prey, as recent experiments have suggested (Gienapp
and Visser, 2006). However, empirical evidence supporting our ideas about
learning and phenotypic plasticity is still lacking. We believe that it would be
of major interest if experimentalists were to attempt to check the predictions
made by our model in real ecological systems.
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Figure captions
Figure 1.
Plot of the distribution P (ppk) in the steady state (after 10000 time steps)
for N = 2001 averaged over 25 realizations. The series a to d shows the effect
of varying L while keeping w = 0.1 and r = 0.4. The series e to h shows the
effect of varying r while keeping L = 0.2N and w = 0.1. The series i to l
shows the effect of varying w while keeping L = 0.2N and r = 0.3.
Figure 2.
Number of persistents as a function of time once in the steady state (the results
plotted correspond to times 500 < t < 1000 and N = 2001). The dotted line
corresponds to the parameter values in Figure 1.a.; the dashed-dotted line
corresponds to parameter values in Figure 1.c.; the solid line corresponds to
the parameter values in Figure 1.d.
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